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[Sac. No. 6819. In Bank. Feb. 6,1959.] 
HAROLD L. HOTLE et a1., as Executors, etc., Appellants, v. 
EVELYN F. MILLER, as Special Administrator, etc., 
Respondent. 
[1] Reformation of Instruments-Pleading.-A complaint by exe-
eutors of a will alleging that on a designated date testatrix 
and her husband opened a joint tenancy bank account, that 
on another date more than 12 years later the spouses orally 
agreed that, regardless of how title was held, all their property 
had been acquired as community property and that "all of 
said property, and any and all property which they might 
therenfter acquire, should be held and owned by them as com-
munity property regardless of the way the reeord title might 
stand at any time," that they employed an attorney to draft 
the written instrument, which they executed in the mistaken 
1.elief that it correctly expressed their oral understanding, but 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Reformation of Instruments, § 35; 
r2, 3, 6, 7, 9] Banks, § 85(1); [4] Evidence, § 327; [5] Evidence, 
§ 381; [8] Husband and Wife, § 159. 
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that the attorney'. draft set forth a dc!ecth"e description of 
the existing property and made, no reference to propedy 
thereafter to be acquired, stated a cause of action for reforml\-
tion of the oral agreement on the ground of mutual mistllk!l 
if such reformation would serve any interests of plaintiffs, 
which it would if the oral agreement could affect the rights 
of the parties in the joint aecount. 
[2] Banks-Deposits-J'oint Tenancy or Ownership.-Former Cali-
fornia Bank Act, § 15a (1 Deering's Gen. Laws 1937, Act 652), 
in effect at the time a joint tenancy bank account was opened 
between husband and wife, became a part of the contract of 
the parties. 
[3] ld.-Deposits-Joint Tenancy or Ownership.-Under former 
California Bank Act, § 15a (1 Deering's Gen. Laws 1937, Act 
652), the making of a joint tenancy bank deposit was eon-
elusive evidence of the intention of the depositors at that 
time to vest title in the survivor, but the statute did not 
compel depositors thereafter to remain frozen to that intention 
and did not deprive thenl of their freedom of contract to make 
subsequent agreements ehanging their interests in the account. 
[4] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence.-The parol evidence rule comes 
into operation when there is a single and final memorial of 
the understanding of the parties; when that takes place, 
prior and contemporaneous negotiations, oral or written, are 
excluded. 
[5] ld.-Extrinsic Evidence-Subsequent Agreements.-The parol 
evidence rule has no power to preclude future negotiations. 
Any contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged 
or modified by subsequent agreement of the parties. 
[6] Banks-Deposits-Joint Tenancy or Ownership.-Even if for-
Uler California Bank Act, § 15a (1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
652) were interpreted to deprive the depositors of a joint 
tenancy bank account of their freedom to make subsequent 
contracts changing their rights in the joint account, there 
could be no such deprivation following the repeal of that 
section in 1949. Financial Code, § 852, based thereon, not only 
omits the provision making the form of deposit conclusive 
evidence of the intent of the parties to vest title in the 
survivor, but expressly recognizes that the deposit agreement 
may not accurately reflect the interests of the depositors in the 
account. 
[7] Id.-Deposits-Joint Tenancy or Ownership.-Although the 
repealed provision of California Bank Act, § 15a (1 Deering's 
[2] See CaJ.Jur.2d, Banks, § 107 et seq.; Am.Jur., Banks, 
§§ 425, 435. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 255; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1091. 
) 
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Gen. Laws, Act 652) was pnrt of n joint deposit agreemE'nt 
entered into hy hUf;hann :md "'ife while it was in efl'l'ct, sinl'c 
its repeal :\11,'1" rl'litrietion it llIig-ht thl'l'ctofore hnve impo!'l'd 
on the d<'po!Oiton;' power to contrnct could survivc only by 
'Virtue of its continued existence liS pal't of the contract of the 
pnl'til's, who could not, llOWeyer, contrnct away their powcr 
to conil'nct in thc future, since the law, not privnte agreement, 
uetermines the essential elements of n vnlid contract. 
[8] Husband and Wife-Changing Character of Property by 
Agreement,.-A husband and wife may change the charactE'r 
of their property by agreement. 
,[9] Banks-Deposits-Joint Tenancy or Ownership.-Implicit in 
un oral agreement between husband and wife to change the 
nnture of their iuterests in n joint bank deposit, entered into 
subsequent to repeal of California Bank Act,' § 15a (1 Deer-
ing's Gen. Laws, Act 652), relating to joint deposits, was the 
mutual aDrogation by the parties of any conflicting provision 
in their joint tenancy agreement. Their abrogation was effec-
tive, since they were free to contract at that t.ime wit.hout 
regard to any limitations imposed by the repealed provision. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of So-
noma Couuty. Hilliard Comst.ock, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for reformation of a written agret'mellt. Judgment 
for defendant entered on sustaining a general demurrer to 
nrst amended complaint without leave to amend, l·eversed. 
Donald M. Scott and Lounibos & Lounibos for Appellants. 
Leon J. Libeu and Frank W. Finn for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs, execut.ors of the will of Sey-
mour Frizclle, appeal from a judgment for defendant, special 
administrator of the estate of Jennie Frizelle, in an action 
for reformation of a written agreement executed in January, 
1953. The judgment was entered upon the sustaining of a 
general demurrer to the ,nrst amended complaint 'without 
leave to amend. 
The complaint alleged: 
On November 6, 1940, Seymour and Jennie opened an 
account with the Bank of Sonoma. The deposit agreement 
provided that "We hereby agree with each other and the 
bank, that all moneys J10W or hereafter deposited by us or 
either of us with the bank in this account shall be so drposited 
[8] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Community Propel·ty, §§ 18, 46, 56, 58; Am. 
Jur., HllSl)::ntl amI Wifc, §§ 281,302. 
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and shall be received and held by the bank with the under-
standing and upon the conditions that said money as deposited, 
without consideration of its previous ownership, and all 
. interest therein (if any there be) shall be the property of 
both of us as joint tenants and shall be payable to and col-
. lectable by either of us during our joint lives, and after death 
of OIie of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the 
surviTor, and shall be payable to and collectable by such 
survivor. " 
In January, 1953, Seymour and Jennie orally agreed that 
regardless of how title was held, all of their property had been 
acquired as their community property, that" all of said prop-
erty, aud any and all property which they might thereafter 
acquire, should be held and owned by them as community 
property regardless of the way the record title might stand 
at any time," and that they would execute a written agree-
ment so providing. They employed an attorney to draft the 
written agreement, which they executed in the mistaken 
belief that it correctly expressed their oral understanding. 
The attorney's draft, however, set forth a defective descrip-
tion of the existing property and made no reference to prop-
erty thereafter to be acquired. 
On October 20, 1954, Seymour executed a will in which he 
undertook to dispose of all of the community property, and 
Jennie executed a waiver of claim to her share of the com-
munity property in view of her election to accept the terms 
of the will. 
Seymour died on March 2, 1955. The balance in the bank 
account was then $42,357.14. Jennie died on July 17, 1955. 
Plaintiffs contend that they have stated a cause of action 
for reformation of the 1953 agreement, that under the agree-
ment as reformed the balance of the account is community 
property, and that they are therefore entitled to administer 
it as such pursuant to the terms of the will and Jennie's 
waiver. Defendant contends, on the other hand, that whether 
reformed or not the agreement cannot operate to change the 
rights of the parties in the joint tenancy bank ftccount, that 
title to it therefore vested in Jennie when she survived Sey-
mour, and that since there is no allegation that any other 
property is affected by the agreement, its reformation would 
serve no purpose. 
[1] The complaint states a cause of action for reformation 
of the 1953 agreement on the ground of mutual mistake (Civ. 
Code, § 3399; Murphy v. Rooney, 45 Cal. 78; Oatman v. Nie-
) 
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meyer, 207 Cal. 424, 425·427 [278 r. 1043]; see Bailat'd v. 
Marden, 36 Ca1.2d 703, 708 L237 P.2d 10]) if such reforma-
tion would serve any interest of plaintiffs. (A.1tCrbach v. 
Healy, 174 Cal. 60, 63 [161 P. 1157].) It would if the 1953 
agreement eould affect the rights of the parties in the joint 
account. 
[2] Defendant invokes former section 15a of the Cali-
fornia Bank Aet (1 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Aet 652, 
pp. 221-222), in effect at the time the joint account was opened, 
to establjsh that the 1953 agreement cannot operate to defeat 
Jennie's right of survivorship. That section provided in part: 
"When a deposit shall be made in any bank by any person 
or persons whether minor or adult in the names of such 
depositor or depositors and another person or persons, and 
in form to be paid to any of them or the survivor or survivors 
of them, such deposit and any additions thereto made by any 
such persons after the making thel·eof, shall become the prop-
erty of such persons as joint tenants, and the deposit together 
with all dividends or interest thereon, shall be held for the 
exclusive use of such persons and may be paid to any of 
them during their lifetime or to the survivor or survivors after 
the death of one or more of them, and such payment and the 
receipt or acquittance of the perSOll or persons to whom such 
payment is made shall be valid and sufficient release nnd dis-
charge to such bank for aU payments made on account of such 
deposit prior to the receipt by such bank of notice in writing 
not to pay such deposit in accordance with the terms thereof. 
The making of the deposit in such form shall, in the absence 
of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive t.t.'idence, in any 
action or proceeding to which either such bank ortke surviv-
ing depositor or depositors may be a party, of the intention 
of such depositors to vest title to such deposit and the addi-
tions thereto in such sllrvivor 01· survivors." (Italics added.) 
Since this section was in effect at the time the account was 
opened, it became a part of the contract of the parties. (Com-
astri v. Burke, 137 Ca1.App.2d 430, 434 [290 P.2d 663].) 
Defendant aceordin~ly contends that in the absence of fraud 
or undue influence, plaintiffs cannot now show that the parties 
did not intend that title should vest in the survivo~. 
[3] There is no doubt that under the statute the making 
of the deposit is conclusiye evidence of the intention of the 
depositors at that time to vest titlc in the survivor. It does 
not follow, llOwever, that the statute compels depositc)rs there-
111 C.Zd-18 
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after to remain frozen to that intention. It in no way 
deprives the depo~jtors of tlleir freedom or eontract to make 
subsequcnt agreements changing their intt~r(>.sts in the ac-
count. Such freedom is expressly recognized in Civil Code, 
section 1698, which provides that a " contract in writing may 
be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed oral 
agreement, and not otherwise." Section 15a cannot reason-
ably be interpreted to impair this freedom to alter one eontract 
by another. There is nothing in its language that would 
ju!';tify such interpretation. The intention to which it refers 
i:i the intention manifested by the making of the deposit in 
the specified form and thus necessarily the intention existing 
at the time that form is used. Its eonstrained language can-
not be enlarged to nullify any subsequent contracts between 
the depositors and thereby to repeal by implication Civil Code, 
section 1698. 
[4] This interpretation of section 15a in no way departs 
from the parol evidence rule. "Extrinsic evidence is ex-
cluded because it eannot serve to pro,'e what the agreement 
was, this being determined as a matter of law to be the 
writing itself. The rule comes into operation when there is a 
single and final memorial of the understauding of the parties. 
When that takes place, prior and contemporaneous negotia-
tions, oral or written, are excluded; or, as it is sometimes 
said, the written memorial supersedes these prior or con-
temporaneous negotiations." (Estate of Gaines, 15 Cal.2d 
255,265 [100 P.2d 1055].) [5] Obviously, however, it has 
no corresponding power to preclude future negotiations .•• Any 
contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged or 
modified by subsequent agreement of the parties. No con-
tract whether oral or written can be varied, contradicted, or 
discharged by an antecedent agreement. Today may control 
the effect of what happened yesterday; but what happened 
yesterday cannot change the effect of what happens today. 
This, it is believed, is the substance of what has been un-
fortunately called the 'parol evidence rule.'" (3 Corbin on 
Contracts, § 574, pp. 222-223; s(>e also ,3 Williston on Con-
tracts [rev. ed.], § 632, p. 1817; McKeon v. Gi'U.~to, 44 Ca1.2d 
]52, ]56-]57 [280 P.2d 782], and cases cited.) Paterson v. 
OOlll4Stri, 39 Ca1.2d 66 [244 P.2d 902], Me(leit·os v. Cotia, 
134 Cal.App.2d 452 [286 P.2d 546], Comastri v. Burke, 137 
Cal.App.2d 430 [290 P.2d 663], and other cases interpreting 
section 15a of the Bank Act are not to the contrary, for none 
of them involved a subsequent agreement changing the rigllll\ 
or the dE'positors in a joint account. 
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[6] Even if section 15a were interpreted to deprive the 
<1epositors of their freedom to make subsl'qucnt contracts 
changing their rights in thc joiut account there could be no 
such deprivation following thc repeal of that section ill 1949. 
Sl'dioll 832 of the Pinaneial Code bascd thereon not only 
omits the provision making the form of the deposit conclusive 
evidence of the intent of the parties to vest title in the sur-
vivor, but expressly recognizes that the deposit agreement may 
not accurately reflect the interests of the depositors in the 
account. It provides that the bank may refuse payment after 
notice from a depositor "not to permit withdrawals in ac-
cordance with the terms of the account. _ . _ After receipt of 
such notice, a bank may refuse, without liability, to honor 
any check, rceeipt, or withdrawal order on the account pend-
ing determination of the rights of the parties." 
[7] Although the repealed provision of section 15a was a 
part of the joint deposit agreement entered into while it was 
in effect, since its repeal, any restriction it might theretofore 
llave imposed on the depositors' power to contract, could 
survive only by virtue of its continued existence as part of 
the contract of the parties. The parties could not, how-
ever, contract away their power to contract in the future, for 
the law, 110t private agreement, determines the essential ele-
ments of a valid contract. (See 6 Corbin on Contracts, § 1293, 
pp. 158-161.) [8] A husband and wife may change the 
character of their property by agreement. (Civ. Code, § 158 ; 
Estate 0/ WieUng, 37 Ca1.2d 106, 108 [230 P.2d 808].) 
[9] Clearly implicit in the 1953 agreement in this case was 
the mutual abrogation by the parties of any conflicting pro-
vision in their joint tenancy agreement. Their abrogation 
was effective, since they were free to contract in 1953 without 
regard to any limitations imposed by the repealed provision. 
Ehrman v. Ro.~enthal, 117 Cal. 491 [49 P. 460], and It'ifts 
v. Mission 1I ealth etc. Shop, 58 Ca1.App. 362 [208 P. 691], 
cited by defendant are not to. the contrary. Tllose eases cor-
rectly bold that two parties to a tripartite agreement canllot 
(']lange it to the prejudice of the third party. In the present 
case the bank will in no way be prejudiced by recognizing its 
depositors' subsequent agreement between themselves. 
'l'he judgment is reversed. 
Gibsoll, C .. T., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
McComb, J., dissented. 
